Jeramey McElhaney and Mary McElhaney, Appellees, v. The City of Moab and the Moab City Councll.,  Appellants. by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) 
2017 
Jeramey McElhaney and Mary McElhaney, Appellees, v. The City 
of Moab and the Moab City Councll., Appellants. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, McElhaney and McE v City of Moab, No. 20160142 (Utah Supreme Court, 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3219 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




THE CITY OF MOAB and THE 
MPAB CITY COUNCll., 
District Case No. 140748 
Appellate Case No. 20160142 
u Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPEi I EE ON CERTIFICATION 
THIS IS A DIRECT ,\PPEAL ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UTAH 
COURT OF ,\PPEALS FROM AN ORDER ENTERED IN THE 
SEVENffi:JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE, LYLE R. ANDERSON, 
PRESIDING 
Christopher G. Mc.Anany 
Attorney for Appellants 
----oOo--
CRAIG C. HALLS, BAR NO. 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, UT 84511 
Phone: (435) 678-3333 
Facsimile: (435) 678-3330 
Dufford, Waldeck, Milburn & Krohn, LLP 
7 44 Horizon Court, Suite 300 
Grand Junction, CO 81506 
ORAL ARGUMENTS/ PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTEDILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS · 
MAR 1 6 2017 
~-
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 




THE CITY OF MOAB and THE 
MPAB CITY COUNCIL, 
District Case No. 1407 48 
.Appellate Case No. 20160142 
.Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPEi T EE ON CERTIFICATION 
THIS IS A DIRECT .APPEAL ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS FROM AN ORDER ENTERED IN THE 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE, LYLE R. .ANDERSON, 
PRESIDING 
Christopher G. Mc.Anany 
.Attorney for Appellants 
-------o0o------
CRAIG C. HALLS, BAR NO. 1317 
333 South Main Street 
Blanding, UT 84511 
Phone: ( 435) 678-3333 
Facsimile: ( 435) 678-3330 
Dufford, Waldeck, Milburn & Krohn, LLP 
744 Horizon Court, Suite 300 
Grand Junction, CO 81506 
ORAL ARGUMENTS/ PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
~·· 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
T.ABLE OF .L\UTHORITIES ........................................................................................................... ii 
.ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
I. THURSTONHOLDS THAT INPUT FROM NEIGHBORING LANDOWNERS IS 
PROPER BUT UNDUE RELIANCE ON SUCH INPUT MAY NOT BE THE 
CRITERION FOR THE DENIAL OF THE PERMIT .................................................. 1 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS ARE NOT INFRINGED WHERE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IS PROVIDED; AND SUCH FREEDOMS DO NOT 
ENTITLE THE SPEAKERS TO ACTION IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR 
OPINIONS ................................................................................................................................... 5 
III. THE CORRECT STANDARD TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
DENIAL OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT IS WHETHER THE 
DECISION TO DO SOW AS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL ....... 6 
IV. THE PUBLIC CLAMOR DOCTRINE IS ONE METHOD OF DETERMINING 
WHETHER THE DENIAL WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL 
BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE THE SOLE BASIS TO DENY A CONDITIONAL 
USE PERMIT ................ : .............................................................................................. 7 
V. THE DOCfRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR DOES NOT APPLY TO LEGISLATIVE 
DECISIONS BUT DOES APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TO DENY 
A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT ........................................................................... 11 
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR IS CLEAR, DOES NOT REQUIRE 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITION, AND WAS ERRONEOUSLY RELIED UPON BY 
THE CITY TO DENY THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT .............................. 12 
VII. MCELHANEYS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
~ PURSUANT TO UT. R. APP. P. 33 .......................................................................... 15 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 15 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Caselaw: ~ 
Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Servs. Inc., 652 P.2d 400,411 
(Wyo.1982) ..................................................................................................................... 9 
Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. Ctty of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 
(Minn.1984) .................................................................................................................... 9 
City of Barnum v. County of Carlton, 386 N.W.2d 770 ...................................................... 9 
City ofClebw-ne v. Clebw-ne Living Center, 413 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 313 
(1985) ..................................................................................................................... 7,8,10 
C.R. Invs., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.1981) ............................. 9 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 156 P.2d 704, 711-12 (Utah App.1988) .................. 6,9,10 
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ,r 105, 54 P .3d 1069 ........................................................ 5 
" Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 635-636 (Utah, 1961) ............................ 11,12. 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App. 31, ,r26, 997 P.2d 321 .................... 11,12 
Jacques v. Zoning Board of Review, 64 R.I. 284, 12 A.2d 222 ........................................... 3 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) ........ 8 
Parker v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of East Providence, 156 A.2d 210 
(R.I. 1959) .............................................................................................................. 2,3,4,5 
Ralph L WadS'Rlorth Construction, Inc. v. West Jordan City, 2 UT App. 49, iJ 17, 
999 P.2d 1240 ................................................................................................................ 6,7,9,10,12 
State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App. 170, ,r13, 72 P.3d 138 ................................................... 12,13 
Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451. ............................................ 3 
Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 444 45 (Utah 1981) ........................................ 1,2,3,4,5,12 
Rules, Statutes and Constitutions: ~ 
U .s. CONST. A.MEND. I ...................................................................................................... -·· 5 
UT. CODE -'-\NN. §10-9a-801(3) .......................................................................................... ~ ............ 2,6 
UT.R.APP.P. 33 ................................................................................................................ 15 
UT. R. APP. P. 34 ................................................................................................................ 15 
Other 
www.m-w.com, "advisory", accessed March 8, 2017 ......................................................... 2 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. THURSTON HOLDS THAT INPUT FROM NEIGHBORING 
LANDOWNERS IS PROPER BUT UNDUE RELIANCE ON SUCH INPUT 
MAY NOT BE THE CRITERION FOR THE DENIAL OF THE PERMIT. 
The City relies on Thurston v. Cache Coun!J to support its assertion that public clamor 
must be based on discriminatory intent or serious procedural misconduct. Ibid., 626 P.2d 440 
(Utah, 1981); Appellants' Supplemental Brief at pp. 1-2. However, Thurston's holdings are 
supportive to existing public clamor law in Utah. 
Thurston involves Cache County's denial of conditional use permits to build residences 
in an agricultural area. Id. at 442. Cache County developed a numerical evaluation system, 
assigning or denying points to a conditional use pennit application on certain criteria. Id. at 
443. The request was first denied by the county planning commission and upheld by the board 
of county commissioners. Id. In the trial court found the denial was based on 1) lack of points, 
2) objections from adjacent landowners, 3) considerations of health, safety, and general welfare 
of persons residing in the vicinity, and 4) soil type. Id. The board of county commissioners 
similarly denied it on 1) lack of points, 2) access road problems, 3) lack of community services, 
4) soil type, and 5) lack of confonnity with the basic policy of the master plan. Id. 
On appeal, Thurstons argued denial of equal protection stating the ordinance provided 
insufficient guidelines or standards for issuance or denial of conditional use pennits. Id. at 444. 
Thurston found the planning commission was empowered by ordinance to issue/ deny 
conditional use permits, guided by the numerical evaluation system, unless it detrimental to 
the health, safety, or general welfare of the persons residing in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property. Id. "Such statutory standards adequately channel the discretionary activities of the 
Planning Commission, and do not support a claim of denial of equal protection." Id. 
Thurston held that plaintiffs presented no evidence that the Cache County Planning 
Commission's decision was "illegal.1, discriminatory, or an abuse of discretion." Id. It found 
that denial of the permits was based on the numerical evaluation system, together with 
numerous other factors pertinent to the desirability and ultimate benefit of the proposed uses, 
"all of which constitute a legitimate exercise of governmental authority in the enactment of 
the ordinance in question." Id. 
Thurston also addressed "undue reliance on objections filed by the landowners in the 
vicinity" stating, "[w]hile it is true that the consent of neighboring landowners may not be 
made a criterion for the issuance or denial or a conditional use permit, there is no impropriety 
in the solicitation of, or reliance upon, infonnation which may be furnished by other 
landowners in the vicinity of the subject property at a public hearing." Id. at 445. ''There is 
ample evidence to suggest that the input of neighboring landowners in the instant case was of 
this advisory nature." Id. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "advisory'' as "having the 
power or right to make suggestions about what should be done: able to give advice." ,v,v,v.m-
w.com, "advisory", accessed March 8, 2017. 
In detennining the issue of ''uridue reliance" upon the objections from neighboring 
landowners, Thurston relies upon Parker v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Ci!] of East Providence, 156 A.2d 
210 (R.I. 1959) which states, "[a]fter considering the evidence we cannot say that the board 
1 It should be noted the denial of the permit at issue in Thurston was held to a different standard 
of review that has been replaced by UTAH CODE .ANN. §10-9a-801(3), which requires the 
detennination of only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal. 
2 
abused their discretion in finding that it did not indicate to them that the proposed gasoline 
filling station would serve the public convenience and welfare." Id. at 212. Parker noted it gave 
"no weight to the second ground of the decision, namely, 'That all of the abutting residential 
property owners objected' to the granting of the application." Id. at 213. "If the board's 
decision rested solely on such ground we would have no hesitancy in holding that it would be 
an abuse of their discretion.'' Id. ".A mere poll of the neighboring landowners does not serve 
to assist the board in detennining whether the exception applied or is consistent with the 
public convenience or welfare or whether it will tend to devaluate the neighboring property." 
Id. citingfatYJues v. Zoning Board of Review, 64 R.I. 284, 12 A.2d 222; Sundlun v. Zoning Board of 
Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 A. 451. 
The City argues Thurston ''held that it is appropriate that a local government hear and 
rely upon [adverse public comment]." Appellant's Supplemental brief at p. 4. In reality, 
Thurston is valid law respecting the public clamor doctrine, which this Court and the Utah 
Court of Appeals has determined cannot be the sole basis to deny a conditional use pennit, 
which is discussed post but also supported by Thurston. 
The McElhaneys abided by every orclinance required by the 1M1v.[C to obtain the Permit 
as argued in the Brief of Appellee. As a result, the McElhaneys believe the City's discretionary 
activities were insufficiently tailored to adequately deny the Pennit on grounds other than 
public clamor. Here, the denial of the Pennit was an illegitimate exercise of governmental 
authority. 
The City was pennitted to consider information furnished by the neighboring land 
owners if provided on an "advisory" basis, as opposed to evidentiary one. Thurston at 445. 
3 
Neighboring landowner consent is not a criterion for the issuance or denial of the Pennit Id. 
The input by neighboring landowners in Thurston was "advisory" because the numerical 
evaluation system put in place by Cache County, together with other factors pertinent to 
desirability and ultimate benefit of the proposed use, was the evidence in the record. Id. at 444-
4445. 
Herein, the adverse public comment was not taken as "advisory" but rather as 
evidentiary and dispositive in an improper delegation of the Council's decision-making power. 
Id. at 445. The Council explicitly stated on the record that the neighborhood was dearly not 
interested in allowing the Pennit, the primary concern of residents being to preserve the 
"character of the town", and that the ordinance at issue explicitly allowed the Council to "listen 
to the people in the neighborhoods and to do what the neighborhoods wished." R381-383. 
These statements evidence that the public testimony was wrongfully taken by the Council as 
evidentiary and dispositive (i.e. public clamor) rather than "advisory", which was thus an 
application of improper public clamor as it is defined by Utah law. 
Thurston's holdings relied on Parker, which holdings support Utah's public clamor 
doctrine. Parker involved several factors of denial of a pennit, only one of which was based 
on the objections of the neighboring landowners. The Parker court explicitly stated that the 
governing body's decision would be an abuse of discretion if it solely rested on the grounds 
of neighboring landowner objections. Parker at 213. Parker supports later Utah law directing 
that the denial of a conditional use permit must be based on sufficient evidence, because ''a 
mere poll of the neighboring landowners does not serve to assist the board in determining 
whether the exception applied for is consistent with the public convenience or welfare or 
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whether it will tend to devaluate the neighboring property." Id. ( emphasis added). Thurston and 
Parker constitute valid law concerning the doctrine of public clamor. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS ARE NOT INFRINGED WHERE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IS PROVIDED; AND SUCH FREEDOMS DO 
NOT ENTITLE THE SPEAKERS TO ACTION IN CONFORMITY WITH 
THEIR OPINIONS. 
''The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress 'shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."' Gallivan 
v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ,r 105, 54 P.3d 1069 (citations omitted) . 
.Appellant argues that U.S. CONST. AMEND. I is infringed upon by application of 
Thurston Coun!J and the public clamor doctrine to conditional land use permits. Their 
supplemental brief argues that "the boundaries of the public clamor doctrine must be clearly 
defined so that fundamental First Amendment freedoms to speak and, more importantly, to 
have one's concerns acted upon, are not displaced by a de facto exclusionary rule as to public 
testimony." See, ibid. at p. 5. Appellant further argues that Appellee urges this type of rule. Id., 
citing Response Brief, p. 45. 
Appellee does not seek to exclude public testimony in these types of matters, nor does 
the reference to the Response Brief support this contention. Appellee seeks to uphold Utah 
law that a land use pennit decision cannot rest solely on public testimony or clamor. Appellant 
had their opportunity to address, or petition, their local government and be heard in exercise 
of their rights under the First .Amendment. However, they have provided no authority-and 
none exists-to indicate that the First Amendment rights include the ''right to have one's 
concerns acted upon" as they allege in their supplemental brie£ A local government council 
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maintruns authority to consider public testimony as "advisory" but not evidentiary and 
dispositive, and such consideration must be in concert with other more appropriate factors 
for making the determination on a conditional land use pennit. This rule in no way infringes 
upon the First Amendment rights of neighboring landowners, as further argued post. 
III. THE CORRECT STANDARD TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
DENIAL OF THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT IS WHETHER THE 
DECISION TO DO SO WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL. 
In an appeal from a municipality's land use decision, "[t]he courts shall: (i) presume 
that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ri) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal." UT.AH CODE.ANN. §10-9a-801(3). 
The McEihaneys have relied upon 'Ralph L Wadsworth Construction, Inc. v. West Jordian 
Ci!J due to its holding that, "[b]ecause the decision to deny an application for a conditional 
use permit may not be based solely on adverse public comment, ... , we conclude this finding 
is insufficient to support the City Council's denial of appellants' application." Ibid., 2000 UT 
App. 49,117, 999 P.2d 1240 (emphasis added); see Davis Coun!J v. Clearfield Ci!J, 756 P.2d 704, 
711-12 (Utah App.1988). Thus, the &lph court found a decision "arbitrary and capricious" 
where not supported by evidence. Id. at ,I18. 
The City argues the Public Clamor Doctrine can only be applied when procedural 
misconduct or discrimination occurs. This Court is only tasked with determining whether or 
not the decision to deny the conditional use permit was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. UTAH 
CODE .ANN. §10-9a-801(3). The Council arbitrarily and capriciously denied the Permit for the 
sole reason of adverse public comment, rendering its decision unsupported by evidence. Ralph 
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at ,r17. This Court must detennine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the denial, 
and whether the consideration of public clamor as the sole reason to deny the Permit is 
properly undertaken, regardless of whether the clamor was based on procedural misconduct 
or discrimination. Therefore, the City's request to alter Utah law should be dismissed 
forthright as it contradicts the established standard of review. 
IV. THE PUBLIC CLAMOR DOCTRINE. IS ONE METHOD OF 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE DENIAL WAS ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE THE SOLE 
BASIS TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
The City argues the public clamor doctrine has been applied when procedural 
misconduct or discrimination occurs. However, precedent indicates that public clamor cannot 
be the sole basis to reject the application, and it has not been applied as posed by the City. 
The City cites to Ci!J of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center as grounds that public clamor 
cannot be based on discrimination. Ibid., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed. 313 (1985). 
However, it misinterprets Cleb11T1Je, which involved a living center that desired to lease a certain 
building for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. Id., 473 U.S. at 432, 105 
S.Ct. at 3250. The center was advised a special use pennit was required but was denied after a 
public hearing. Id. The center filed suit, alleging the zoning ordinance violated the Equal 
Protection rights of the facility and its potential residents. Id. Thus, Cleburne analyzed whether 
mental retardation was a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection clause. Id., 473 U.S. 
at 433-447, 105 S.Ct. at 3251-3258. Cleburne found the city did not require a special use permit 
in this particular zone for other housing or hospital-type developments. Id., 473 U.S. at 447, 
105 S.Ct. at 3258. Even though the "mentally retarded" as a group are different from others, 
" ... this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who would 
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occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such 
as boarding houses and hospitals would not." Id., 473 U.S. at 448, 105 S.Ct. at 3258. The court 
found no rational basis that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city's 
legitimate interests, and affinned that the ordinance was invalid as applied. Id. 
Cleburne noted the denial of the permit rested on several factors by the city, including 
the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located withln 200 feet of the 
proposed facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood. Id., 473 
U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 3259. "But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors 
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a 
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the 
like." Id. ''It is plain that the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could 
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection Clause, ... , and the City may not avoid 
the strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the 
body politic." Id. (citation omitted). "'Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but 
the law cannot, directly or indirectly~ give them effect."' Id. citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984). Cleburne rejected the denial of the pennit on 
the grounds the facility was too closely located to a junior high, there might be overcrowding 
of persons living in the facility, and congestion in the stre~ts, finding these grounds were 
insufficient because the other uses freely permitted in the zone and neighborhood were 
granted without similar concern or restriction. Id., 473 U.S. at 449-450, 105 S.Ct. at 3259-3260. 
Cleburne was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, but provides similar guidance on 
the public clamor doctrine as is found in Utah-it cannot be the sole basis of the denial of a 
8 
conditional use pennit 
In Ralph, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals found public clamor was the sole basis for 
the denial of the conditional use permit when the city denied the application on two (2) 
grounds, to wit 1) ''[t]he city has made a significant investment in bringing Dannon to the 
area and ... [o]utdoor storage is detrimental to the area ... and injurious to the goals of the city"; 
and 2) appellants' outdoor storage "may be considered ... a nuisance". Ibid. at ,Mf17-18. Ralph 
found the only support in the record were concerns expressed by the neighboring landowners. 
Id. There was no evidence of actual investigation into the specific concerns raised by the public 
or what reasons lead to these conclusions; accordingly, Ralph was reversed because the denial 
was not based on the sufficient factual basis, rendering it arbitrary and capricious. Id. at ,I19. 
Similarly, Davis Coun!J v. Clearfield Ci-!J detennined, ''[e]ven if the reasons given in the 
motion adopted by the council might otherwise be legally sufficient ... the denial of a permit is 
arbitrary when the reasons are without sufficient factual basis." Ibid., 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah 
App. 1988); see, e.g., CR lnvs., Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (]Minn.1981). Davis 
involved the proposed operation of a residential treatment program for youth and adults 
suffering from substance abuse; however, public hearing yielded concerns about parking, 
increased crime, and reduction of property values. Id. at 705. Davis relied on Shoreview, Thurston, 
Board of Coun!J Comm'rs v. Teton Coun!J Youth Servs. Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 411 (Wyo.1982), Ci!J of 
Barnum v. Coun!J of Carlton, 386 N.W.2d 770, and Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of 
Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 340 (]Minn.1984) for the detennination that public clamor cannot 
be the sole basis to deny the permit Id. at 711-712. As held by Chanhassen, "denial of a 
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conditional use must be based on something more concrete than neighborhood opposition 
and expressions of concern for public safety and welfare." Ibid. at 340. 
Herein, the doctrine of public clamor has a broad definition because there must be 
sufficient grounds and evidence to deny an application for a conditional use permit A 
governing body cannot reject an application because neighboring land owners object Such 
circwnstances are readily apparent in cases like Cleburne, where pennits for similar facilities 
were regularly granted in that particular zone, and the denial was rooted in adverse public 
opinion. Denial is inappropriate where a governing body has failed to sufficiently find grounds 
in the evidence to deny the application and the flimsy reasons to do so are found in adverse 
public comment. Accordingly, "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors 
which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases" for denying 
the Pennit., which is what happened herein. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 3259. 
The only findings given on the record by the Council to deny the Permit were in the 
concerns expressed by neighboring ·landowners, which had been investigated by City staff at 
the planning commission stage of the application and recommended for approval after 
investigation. Similar to Ralph, the denial in this case was not based on sufficient factual basis, 
which constitutes an arbitrary and capricious denial of the Permit. Ibid. at ~17-19. 
Moreover, even if this case does not amount to public clamor, the denial must still be 
based on a "sufficient factual basis," which is lacking herein. Davis at 711. The denial in this 
case "must be based on something more concrete than neighborhood opposition and 
expressions of concern for public safety and welfare." Davis at 711-712 citing Chanhassen at 340. 
The McElhaneys complied with all of the requirements of the ordinance and the directives of 
10 
the planning commission. The McElhaneys have been unable to find anything more concrete 
to support the denial other than neighborhood opposition, which is insufficient. Id. 
Accordingly, Utah law on the public clamor doctrine applies to require evidentiary and factual 
support in the record to support a denial of the conditional use permit, not special 
circumstances as .Appellants argue. 
\ 
V. THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR DOES NOT APPLY TO 
LEGISLATIVE DECISIONS BUT DOES APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECISIONS TO DENY A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT. 
The City argues in a footnote, "this Court has recogni2ed that a local government may 
properly rely upon all manner of public testimony when it acts in a legislative context, such as 
a rezoning decision." Appellant's Supplemental Brief at p. 2, fn. 1. The City cites to Gt!Jland v. Salt 
Lzke Coun'!), 358 P.2d 633, 635-636 (Utah, 1961). However, the public clamor doctrine does 
not apply to legislative decisions made by government bodies, and therefore the reliance on 
public opinion for legislative actions has no bearing on the case at hand. 
In the case of Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed both 
Davis Coun'!) v. Clearfield Ci9 and Gay/and. Ibid., 2000 UT App. 31, ,I26, 997 P.2d 321. "In relying 
on Davis Coun'!), however, Hannon incorrectly equates review of the administrative decision 
to deny a conditional use pennit with review of a legislative act." Id. "Although both actions 
are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a city may rely on the concerns of 
interested citizens when perfonning legislative functions." Id. "As Gay/and points out, the 
public clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity. 
We thus conclude that the Draper City Council was not required to disregard the concerns of 
its electorate--or its own concerns-when perfonning in a legislative capacity." Id. at ,I27 citing 
11 
Gay/and at 635-636. The City's point is completely moot pursuant to the holdings of Harmon. 
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC CLAMOR IS CLEAR, DOES NOT 
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL DEFINITION, AND WAS ERRONEOUSLY 
RELIED UPON BY THE CITY TO DENY THE CONDITIONAL USE 
PERMIT. 
The City argues clarification of Thurston is appropriate because lower courts misapply 
it in a manner that infringes on the First Amendment. The City believes Ralph evidences that 
lower courts are applying the concept of public clamor to infringe upon "the constitutionally 
mandated right to petition." Id. at pp. 4-5. However, Thurston and 'Ralph both allow for public 
comment, but hold that adverse public comment cannot be the sole basis of the denial of a 
conditional use permit. Thurston at 445 (neighboring landowner consent cannot be a criterion 
for issuance/ denial; however, the council can solicit and rely on information furnished by 
neighboring landowners in an advisory role); Ralph at iJ17 (''Because the decision to deny an 
application for a conditional use permit may not be based solely on adverse public 
comment ... we conclude this finding is insufficient to support the City Council's denial of 
appellants' application."). There is no hypothetical chilling effect on First Amendment rights. 
Moreover, the City is correct in a broader sense that bias or improper purpose, serious 
procedural misconduct, and discrimination may constitute public clamor. However, the City 
wishes to improperly narrow the definition of public clamor to only these occurrences, when 
this Court has not seen fit to do so previously and there is no support for doing so now. 
The City has not presented any legal authority, law or statute, argument, or analysis of 
the legal authority or law to support its claims to this effect Rather, the City relies on bold 
assertions and far-sweeping unsupported argument The City's arguments should therefore be 
declined on this basis alone. See, State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App. 170, iJ13, 72 P.3d 138 ("Briefs 
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must contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An issue is inadequately 
briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research 
and argument to the reviewing court."). 
The McElhaneys' Brief of Appellee fully sets forth the adverse public comment relied on 
by the City in denying the pennit, briefly summarized as follows: Councilwoman Peterson 
cited to the General Plan to deny the Pennit; however, she then stated, "[a]nd in this specific 
instance in this zone, I feel like what we're being asked to do is to force a commercial business 
o:a a mside:atial uea that cleuly is not i:aterested i:a cn:at:ing a commercial zone." R381, 
In. 11-15 ( emphasis added). Councilwoman Ershadi stated that, in her campaign, the p.timuy 
concem voiced by .residents to her at that time was the chuacte.r of the town R382. 
Councilwoman Ershadi stated the character of the town was tied with economic opportunity 
because a huge concern was the nightly rentals in town were talcing over and less space 
belonged to the local mside:ats. Id. Councilman Bailey stated he was the chairman of the 
land commission that wrote the ordinance allowing bed and breakfasts to be allowed in the R-
2 zone. R383. Councilman Bailey stated they allowed overnight rentals in the R-3 zone and 
"we tried to open it so that there was some opportunity for R2s to get into a business, a bed 
and breakfast". Id. Couoci)mao Bailey stated the clear intent behind the zoning ordinances was 
to "listen to the people in the neighborhoods a:ad to do what tbe neighbo.t:hoods wished 
a:ad that's why we bad that- clearly mirumal negative impact on adjacent residential areas, 
so I think we've seen what this is going to be an impact on the neighborhoods and I can't 
support this." Id, In. 13-18 ( emphasis added). 
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The City argues adverse public comment was "quite specific" respecting projected 
increase in traffic and noise emissions from off-highway vehicles that ''would likely exceed 
City noise ordinance levels." Appellant's Supplemental Brief at p. 9. However, these concerns were 
completely mitigated by the McElhaneys. As to traffic, city staff detennined traffic would 
decrease with the closure of the daycare. R261. As to noise, the City staff determined that, 
since the owners reside on the premises, noise is less of a concern. Id. As to off-highway 
vehicle noise, the operation of such vehicles is confined to certalll areas by city ordinance and 
State laws. Public clamor was mere speculation that B&B guests would violate such ordinance 
to ride their A TVs in the immediate neighborhood. Should such guests do so, the conditional 
use permit is reviewed every year. None of the citizens "concerns" were supported by evidence 
and were refuted by the city staff and planning commission. The City's arguments actually 
demonstrate public clamor as the sole basis to deny the conditional use pennit 
The overall sentiment from the City Council was rooted in adverse comment &om the 
public, which is arbitrary and capricious. The determination to deny the Application is not 
required to amount to some sort of misconduct, bias, or prejudice against the McElhaneys. 
Adverse public comment cannot be the sole reason to deny the permit, which was the case 
here. The doctrine of public clamor does not need to change, narrow, or be redefined; rather, 
the City Council should not be allowed to deny conditional use pennits on the sole basis that 
the public is adverse to the use. The denial cannot stand because it is not based upon sufficient 
facts or evidence. The district court should therefore be affirmed. 
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VII. MCELHANEYS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO UT. R. APP. P. 33. 
UT. R. APP. P. 33(a) states that " ... if a court determines that a[n] ... appeal taken under 
these rules is . . . frivolous ... , it shall award just damages, which may include single or double 
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/ or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.'' UT. R. 
.APP. P. 33(b) provides a definition staring, "[f]or the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal 
... is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or nor based on a good 
faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Appellants did not support their public clamor below with any evidence, and seek to alter 
long-standing precedent on appeal to support their lack of evidence below. They make 
frivolous First .Amendment claims when existing law provides First .Amendment protections, 
which they received. They have not made a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse 
the precedent on public clamor, but instead have erroneously charged Appellees with 
attempting to exclude public input altogether. Appellees seek only to uphold existing law and 
categorize public clamor appropriately. Appellant's briefs are not grounded in fact, not 
warranted by precedent, and are inadequate to alter existing law. Thus, they are frivolous and 
Appellees are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. UT. R. APP. P. 33(a) and (b). 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the McElhaneys respectfully request this 
Court affirm the Decision entered by the district court. 
DA TED this 9th day of March, 2017. 
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